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Abstract 
This paper introduces a new method of estimating indifference curves in the Marschak-
Machina triangle. The method involves posing questions about indifference. Contrary to pre-
vious attempts, where subjects were required to identify those lotteries to which they were 
indifferent vis-à-vis a given lottery, the subjects are here required to determine its certainty 
equivalent. The procedure is repeated for a large number of lotteries inside the triangle. Sim-
ple, linear interpolation of certainty equivalent values between adjacent points representing 
the lotteries under consideration allows any indifference curve inside the triangle to be plot-
ted. The experimental results presented in the paper shed new light on the shape of indiffer-
ence curves inside the Marschak-Machina triangle, where curve parallelism, fanning-out, fan-
ning-in and boundary effects, including (possibly discontinuous) jumps, are all common. As 
shown, those decision-making models, which can predict jumps on the triangle legs, offer the 
best econometric fit of the indifference curves obtained in the study. 
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1 Introduction 
The Marschak-Machina triangle (Marschak, 1950; Machina, 1982) is a graphical tool for both 
theoretical and experimental considerations concerning the modeling of decision-making un-
der risk. Although introduced for Expected Utility Theory (EUT), it became widely popular 
after EUT paradoxes were explained using the fanning-out hypothesis (Machina, 1982, 1987). 
At first, the Marschak-Machina triangle was used exclusively for theoretical purposes. Since 
then, however, there have been many investigations that have tested hypotheses about the 
shape of the indifference map. Several surveys (Harley, 1992; Abdellaoui and Munier, 1998; 
Blavatskyy, 2006; Bardsley et al., 2000) have shown that Machina’s fanning-out hypothesis is 
too simple and that other indifference curve patterns are also present, e.g. fanning-in and 
boundary effects. 
This paper contributes in at least two areas. First, it proposes a new method of estimating in-
difference curves. Generally, there are two ways to identify indifference curves: ask questions 
about indifference; ask questions about preference. The former method, where subjects identi-
fy lotteries to which they are indifferent vis-à-vis a given one, enables “true” indifference 
lines to be plotted. This, however, is much more difficult to conduct and is rarely used in 
practice. The latter method is easier to conduct but the answers to the questions provide far 
too little information to enable indifference curves to be plotted. All the experimenter can do 
is test hypotheses regarding the shapes of indifference curves in the triangle or regions of it. 
The methodology proposed in this paper involves indifference questions. Instead of determin-
ing lotteries to which people are indifferent vis-à-vis a given lottery, however, lottery certain-
ty equivalents (CE) are determined. The CE values are then used to linearly interpolate the 
indifference curves inside the triangle. This method has several advantages over those de-
scribed in the literature. First, it allows indifference curves to be plotted. At the same time, 
however, it is free of the problems associated with determining lotteries between which peo-
ple are indifferent. It should be pointed out that determining CEs is a known and widely used 
method of estimating decision-making models, e.g. it was used by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) to estimate the CPT parameters, and by Gonzales and Wu (1999) to estimate the pa-
rameters of the probability weighting function. Quite surprisingly, it has never been used (to 
the author’s knowledge) to determine indifference curves inside the Marschak-Machina trian-
gle. All the procedures of conducting experiments using CEs, along with the motivation of the 
subjects, are therefore well established and can be used here without modification. Moreover, 
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all computations are done using a single function of the well known Wolfram Mathematica® 
software. 
The second contribution concerns the results of the experiment conducted using the new 
method. Although these results generally confirm many previous ones, they shed new light on 
the shape of indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle. In particular, they show 
areas of: conformance to EUT; fanning-out; fanning-in; and (possibly discontinuous) jumps in 
the indifference curves. To the best of the author’s knowledge, none of the previous experi-
ments was able to capture all the observations in a single trial. 
Finally, the paper shows that the best econometric fit of the stated indifference curves is ob-
tained by those decision-making models that can predict jumps on the triangle legs. No exist-
ing theory, however, is able to fully accommodate the experimental data presented here.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 revisits the concept of the Mar-
schak-Machina triangle and presents the shapes of the indifference curves predicted by the 
best known theories of decision-making under risk. Section 3 presents a survey of the meth-
ods used to estimate the shape of indifference curves. Section 4 presents a new method of 
estimating indifference curves using lottery CEs. Section 5 presents the experimental results. 
Section 6 discusses the results in more detail and compares them with the results so far pre-
sented in the literature. Section 7 presents estimation results of four decision-making models 
using the data collected in the experiment. Section 8 summarizes the research. 
2 The Marschak-Machina Triangle 
2.1 The concept 
The Marschak-Machina triangle represents the set of all lotteries involving three fixed out-
comes x1 < x2 < x3 having probabilities p1, p2, and p3 respectively. Probability p1 is represented 
on the horizontal axis; probability p3 is represented on the vertical axis; and probability p2 is 
the residual from 1 (since p1 + p2 + p3 = 1). 
Every point in this triangle represents a particular lottery (see Figure 2.1): a point inside the 
triangle represents a three-outcome lottery where p1, p2 and p3 are strictly positive (e.g. lottery 
A); a point on the boundary of the triangle (but not at one of the corners) represents a two-
outcome lottery since one pi is zero (e.g. lottery B); while the corners represent certainties 
(e.g. lottery C). 
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Figure 2.1 Points inside the Marschak-Machina triangle representing lotteries with three fixed outcomes. 
Lottery A: p1=0.2, p2=0.4, p3=0.4; Lottery B: p1=0.7, p2=0.3, p3=0; Lottery C: p1=0, p2=0, p3=1. 
Upward movements in the triangle increase p3 at the expense of p2. Leftward movements in-
crease p2 at the expense of p1. As a result, both these (and more generally, all northwest 
movements) lead to stochastically dominating lotteries that will be preferred. 
2.2 Indifference curves in Expected Utility Theory 
A common and useful way to visualize the predictions of the various decision-making models 
is to inspect their indifference curves, as they connect points representing lotteries of equal 
utility. If the decision-maker behaves in accordance with EUT, then his or her preferences can 
be represented in the Marschak-Machina triangle by a set of indifference curves that are paral-
lel straight lines. This follows immediately from the basic EUT theorem: 
 p1u x1( )+ p2u x2( )+ p3u x3( ) = u*   (1.1) 
where u(x) is the individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and u* is a given 
constant lottery utility. Substituting 1 – p1 – p3 for p2 allows the indifference curves to be de-
scribed as follows: 
 p3 =
u* ! u x2( )
u x3( )! u x2( )
+ p1
u x2( )! u x1( )
u x3( )! u x2( )
  (1.2) 
The slope of the tangent line dp3 / dp1  is constant and only depends on the relative utilities 
of the three outcomes. The indifference curves are therefore straight lines that have the same 
slope, as shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Indifference curves for risk averse people (left) and risk seeking people (right). 
Risk averse people have a larger u(x2) relative to u(x1) and u(x3), and therefore steeper indif-
ference curves. 
2.3 Expected Utility Paradoxes 
Machina (1987) noticed that several paradoxes (including the common ratio and common 
consequence effects) could be explained by postulating indifference curves that “fan out”, i.e. 
are more steeply sloped towards the top left of the triangle and less steeply sloped towards the 
bottom right. Recall the famed Allais paradox in which subjects first choose from the follow-
ing pair: 
Lottery A: A 100% chance of receiving $1 million. 
Lottery B: A 10% chance of receiving $5 million, an 89% chance of receiving $1 million, 
and a 1% chance of receiving nothing. 
They then choose between: 
Lottery C: An 11% chance of receiving $1 million, and an 89% chance of receiving nothing 
Lottery D: A 10% chance of receiving $5 million, and a 90% chance of receiving nothing. 
Most subjects choose A in the first round and D in the second. However, preferring A to B in 
the first round implies steep indifference curves, whereas choosing D in the second round 
implies that the indifference curves are flat. Indifference curves that fan-out could therefore 
explain the paradox. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3.  
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Figure 2.3 The Allais Paradox. Left: parallel indifference curves cannot explain the Allais paradox; right: 
fanning-out indifference curves could explain the Allais paradox. 
2.4 Experimental investigation of the fanning-out hypothesis 
Subsequent experimental investigations have shown that Machina’s fanning out hypothesis is 
too simple; the opposite pattern has been often detected, at least in some areas of the triangle. 
This behavior can be described by indifference curves that “fan in”, i.e. are less steeply sloped 
towards the top left of the triangle and more steeply sloped towards the bottom right. 
It has also been stated that violations of EUT are less frequent when the boundary effects are 
removed, i.e. when the lotteries under consideration are located in the interior of the triangle 
and not on its boundaries. All these new observations led to the development of new theories 
of decision-making under risk with the Marschak-Machina triangle serving as a structure for 
experimental and theoretical work. 
2.5 Axioms, theories and implied indifference curves3 
Straight line indifference curves 
If the Independence Axiom, the crucial EUT axiom, is valid, then the indifference curves are 
straight, parallel lines (see Figure 2.4a). The Betweenness Axiom, a weaker form of the Inde-
pendence Axiom, implies that the indifference curves have to be straight lines, but not neces-
sarily parallel (see Figure 2.4b and d). 
                                                
3 A detailed review on this topic was presented by e.g. Hey and Strazzera (1989) and Camerer (1989). 
Their main conclusions are reminded in this subsection together with those that concern theories de-
veloped more recently. 
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Figure 2.4 Indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle (from Hey and Strazzera, 1989). 
If the Betweenness Axiom holds and the Independence Axiom is replaced by the Weak Inde-
pendence Axiom (Chew and MacCrimmon, 1979) then the straight line indifference curves 
will converge at (fan out from) a unique point outside the triangle - to the southwest of the 
origin (see Figure 2.4b). This pattern of indifference curves is implied by Weighted Utility 
Theory (Chew, 1983) and Transitive SSB Utility Theory (Fishburn, 1983). This is also the 
idea behind Waller’s (1986) “light hypothesis”. A set of straight-line indifference curves fan-
ning out from a point to the southwest of the origin is also implied by Regret Theory (Loomes 
and Sugden, 1982) in the case of statistically independent risky gambles. 
The opposite pattern is presented by a theory introduced by Blavatskyy (2006). His Fanning-
In Axiom, applied in conjunction with the Betweenness Axiom, leads to indifference curves 
fanning-in to a point to the northeast of the hypotenuse (see Figure 2.5 left). 
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Fig, 3. IndifTerence curves assuming implicit weighted utility.
Since betweenness is the only testable property of implicit EU (and it is a test-
able implication ofthe independence axioms of EU and weighted utility also), it is
fortunate that we can test it easily.
1.4. The fanning-out hypothesis
Machina (1982) argued that most empirical violations ofthe strong independence
axiom ofHU could be explained by the hypothesis that indifference curves fan out.
or get steeper from the lower right to the upper left ofthe triangle. (Weighted utility,
with ff(A'M) < 1, also predicts fanning out, and implicit EU permits it.)
Machina's hypothesis uses the notion of (first-order) stochastic dominance, In
general, a gamble A'stochastically dominates Kifthe cumulative distribution func-
tion (cdO of A", denoted Fxiw), is always below or the same as the cdf of ^(i.e.. Fxiw)
< Fy (tv) for all w, with at least one strict inequality). For the three-outcome gambles
shown in the triangle diagram. X stochastically dominates Y \fpi{X) < piiY) and
 
Figure 2.5 Left: Fanning-In Hypothesis (Blavatskyy, 2006). Right: Straight line indifference curves char-
acterizing Implicit EUT do not converge to any specific point (from Camerer, 1989). 
Disappointment Aversion Theory (Gul, 991) implies a mixture of both patterns: the straight 
lines fan out from a point to the south-west of the origin in the bottom right of the triangle and 
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fan in to a point to the north east of the hypotenuse in the top left of the triangle. Another, 
mixed fan hypothesis for fanning-in when the best outcome is highly probable and fanning-
out otherwise was proposed by Neilson (1992). Jia et al. (2001), per contra, developed a gen-
eralized disappointment model that can imply fanning-in in the vicinities of the best and worst 
outcomes. 
If the Betweenness Axiom holds and the Weak Independence Axiom is dropped then the 
straight line indifference curves in the triangle have no restrictions and do not converge to any 
specific point. This characterizes Implicit EUT (Dekel, 1986) (see Figure 2.5 right).  
Nonlinear indifference curves 
If the Betweenness Axiom does not hold then indifference curves are not universally linear. 
This case has been analyzed in depth by Machina (1982). His Hypotheses I and II imply that 
the indifference curves fan out non-linearly across the triangle (see Figure 2.6). 
72 COLIN F. CAMERER
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Eig. 4. Indifference curves assuming the fanning-out hypothesis.
(For instance, if/i(x) = x, c^ i^s the mean ofthe distribution F.) They also suggest an
exponential form for the utility function, t/(x) = (1 — e"''')/(l — f"'O where
x' = ix — x^yix* — x^, and x^ and x* represent the minimum and maximum
values X can have.
Since lottery-dependent EU has no betweenness axiom, in its general form it has
even fewer testable implications than implicit EU. However, the special cases with
CF = \xK>^)dFix) and exponential utility do make predictions about the shape of
indilTerence curves. If we define JC,, = A^L and x* = X^, the lottery-dependent
utilities of our three-outcome gambles are
LDEU: (13)
For ATM = (.^ L + •^H)/2 (as in the low gain and low loss gambles used in the experi-
ment), (13) simplifies to
(14)
+ +
Since (14) is not a linear function of the probabilities, solving for/?,, in terms of/?L
! 
Figure 2.6 Nonlinear indifference curves assuming fanning-out hypothesis (Machina, 1982, 1987, from 
Camerer, 1989). 
In the case of the original Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the indifference 
curves are concave when the decision weight function π(p) is convex. Moreover, because π(p) 
is discontinuous near 0 and 1, the indifference curves are discontinuous along the edges of the 
triangle (see Figure 2.7 left). The properties of the slope in Rank Dependent Utility (Quiggin, 
1982) with a conv x probability weighting function are similar to those in Prospect Theory. 
The indifference curves are, however, continuous. 
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Figure 2.7 Left: Indifference curves assuming the original Prospect Theory (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979, 
from Camerer, 1989). Right: Indifference curves assuming Lottery-Dependent Utility and concave h(x) 
(from Camerer, 1989). 
Assuming Lottery-Dependent Utility (Becker, Sarin, 1987) the indifference curves fan out, as 
they do in Weighted Utility, but they are also concave (or convex depending on h(x)) as they 
are in Rank-Dependent Utility (see Figure 2.7 right). In CPT (Tversky, Kahneman, 1992), 
which has an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function, the indifference curves are 
concave in the upper left corner and convex in the lower right corner (see Figure 2.8 left). 
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Figure 2.8 CPT indifference curves (Tversky, Kahneman, 1992). TAX indifference curves for  ! = 0 . 
The TAX model (Birnbaum, 1997) makes a similar prediction when  ! = 0  (see Figure 2.8 
right). 
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Discontinuous indifference curves 
The indifference curves in the TAX model are, however, discontinuous at all boundaries 
when 0≠δ  (see Figure 2.9 left).  
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Figure 2.9 Left: TAX model indifference curves for  ! = 0.3 . Right: Range-Dependent Decision Utility 
Theory indifference curves (Kontek, Lewandowski, 2013). 
Similarly, the indifference curves are discontinuous at the boundaries in the original Prospect 
Theory (see Figure 2.7 left) and Prospective Reference Theory (Viscusi, 1989). They are, 
however, straight, parallel lines within the triangle in the latter case.  
Security Level, Potential Level Expected Utility (Cohen, 1992) and Range-Dependent Deci-
sion Utility (Kontek, Lewandowski, 2013) have the same characterization: indifference curves 
are straight, parallel lines in the interior of the triangle, and are only discontinuous at the legs 
of triangle (see Figure 2.9 - right). 
3 Experimental Methods to Estimate Indifference Curves 
3.1 General 
There are two ways to identify indifference curves (Hey, Strazzera, 1989): ask indifference 
questions; ask preference questions. The former involves asking subjects to indicate those 
lotteries to which they are indifferent vis-à-vis a given one. This procedure allows an indiffer-
ence curve to be plotted simply by connecting the points representing indifferent lotteries in-
side the triangle. The latter involves presenting subjects with a set of pairwise choices and 
asking them to indicate their preferences. The experimentally observed choice patterns can 
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then be regarded as consistent under the hypothesis that a single decision model underlies all 
these choices. Obviously, nothing can be said about the “true” shape of the individual indif-
ference curves of the subjects. The experimenter is merely told that a subject prefers one 
choice over another but is given no information regarding the “magnitude” of that preference. 
As a result, an infinite number of indifference curves can be plotted between two specific 
points in the triangle. It further follows that one set of responses can be consistent with sever-
al sets of decision model parameters. 
The indifference method gives a lot more information than the preference method, but it suf-
fers from greater experimental difficulties. First, subjects typically do not understand the con-
cept of indifference, and second, indifference experiments are difficult to motivate financially. 
Common empirical practice therefore involves preference questions and hypothesis testing. 
3.2 Detailed 
This sub-section briefly describes some of the best-known experiments so as to give an idea 
of the methods used to estimate indifference curves. Camerer (1989) conducted an experiment 
in which each subject was shown several pairs of lotteries from a set of 14 pairs. These are 
presented in Figure.3.1. 
 
Figure.3.1. Lotteries considered by Camerer (1989) 
Each pair was a choice between a given lottery and its transformation with some of the proba-
bility mass p2 (either 0.1 or 0.2) shifted from the middle outcome x2 to each of the extreme 
outcomes x1 and x3. Three levels of payoffs were used: large gains ($0, $10,000, $25,000); 
small gains (0, $5, $10); and small losses (-$10, -$5, $0). Each subject made a total of 13 
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choices. 
Hey and Di Cagno (1990) conducted another experiment in which the subjects were asked 
pairwise preference questions. The probabilities of all the lotteries were multiples of 1/8. Six-
ty eight subjects were given a total of 60 such preference questions divided into four triangles: 
£0, £10 and £20; £0, £10 and £30; £0, £20 and £30; £10, £20 and £30; with 15 questions per 
triangle. Every question gave the subjects the opportunity to indicate their preference or indif-
ference between two lotteries. 
Hey and Orme (1992) followed the same line, but used more data. Their experiment involved 
80 subjects, each asked 100 pairwise preference questions on two separate occasions. The 
resulting data was used to econometrically estimate the functionals implied by several deci-
sion-making models. It is worth mentioning that experiments of this kind have also been con-
ducted using laboratory rats (Kagel et al. 1990, MacDonald et al. 1991). 
Carbone and Hey (1994) provide an alternative to the standard pairwise ranking approach by 
eliciting a complete ranking, as opposed to a list of preferences from pairs, of 44 gambles 
from the subjects. 
Hey and Strazzera (1989) made the first attempt to estimate a “true” indifference map. 
 
Figure.3.2 Indifference curves of Subject 1 from Hey and Strazzera (1989). 
For each indifference curve, they began with a lottery along one of the edges of the triangle. 
The subjects were then required to identify an indifferent lottery along the hypotenuse. They 
then identified one, two or three other indifferent lotteries inside the triangle. This procedure 
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allowed several indifference curves to be plotted for each of the 9 subjects. These curves were 
then “linearized” to test the “fanning-out” hypothesis. One example of such indifference 
curves is presented in Figure.3.2. 
Abdellaoui and Munier (1994) provide a “Closing In Method”, which is a sequential process 
that determines several preference-equivalents for a number of arbitrarily chosen lotteries. 
Noguchi et al. (2013) developed a non-parametric method of estimating an entire utility map, 
an extension of the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) with People method. Each simula-
tion consisted of three chains starting from three different points inside the triangle. The three 
chains were run until the participants had made 1,000 choices per chain. The samples were 
pooled and smoothed using the Dirichlet kernel density estimation. 
4 A new method of estimating indifference curves 
The new method of estimating indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle is based 
on determining lottery CEs. These values are further used to interpolate any required indiffer-
ence curve(s). 
The experiment involved 67 lotteries for each of two payoff schedules: x1 = 0 zł, x2 = 150 zł, 
x3 = 300 zł; and x1 = 0 zł, x2 = 450 zł and x3 = 900 zł (złoty is the Polish currency, $1 ≈ 3.5 zł).4 
Of these 67 lotteries, 3 were located in the corners of the triangle, 24 on the boundaries, and 
the remaining 40 in the interior.  
To verify the boundary effects and the fanning-out hypothesis, the distribution of lotteries was 
chosen to be more dense near the triangle boundaries and corners. The lotteries were con-
structed from the following list of p1 and p3 probabilities: {0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 
0.95, 0.99, 1}. All combinations {p1, 1 - p1 - p3, p3} such that 1 - p1 - p3 ≥ 0 resulted in the lot-
teries: {0, 1, 0}, {0, 0.99, 0.01}, {0, 0.95, 0.05}, etc. 
The following lotteries were added to verify the boundary effects close to the hypotenuse: 
{0.04, 0.01, 0.95}, {0.19, 0.01, 0.8}, {0.39, 0.01, 0.6}, {0.6, 0.01, 0.39}, {0.8, 0.01, 0.19}, 
{0.95, 0.01, 0.04} all having p2 = 0.01 and {0.1, 0.05, 0.85}, {0.25, 0.05, 0.7}, {0.4 0.05, 
0.55}, {0.55, 0.05, 0.4}, {0.7, 0.05, 0.25}, and {0.85, 0.05, 0.1}, all having p2 = 0.05. 
This set of lotteries is presented as points in the Marschak-Machina triangle in Figure 4.1. 
                                                
4 Although the purchasing power for basic goods is closer to identity. 
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Figure 4.1 The Marschak-Machina triangle with the lotteries examined in the experiment. 
The lotteries were presented in the form of urns containing black, gray and white balls (for 
some lotteries, the balls were only one or two colors). The problems were presented in ran-
dom order and the monetary value of the balls was randomly changed for two of the payoff 
schedules. Moreover, for some participants, the black and white balls offered the maximum 
and minimum payoff respectively, while for other participants, the values of the black and 
white balls were reversed. The gray ball always offered an intermediate payoff.  
To the right of the urn containing the balls of three colors was another urn that only contained 
balls with crosses. An example problem is demonstrated in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2 An example problem from the experiment. 
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In this sample problem, the value of the black ball was 300 zł, the gray ball 150 zł, and the 
white ball 0 zł. The participants had to state the value that a ball with a cross would need to 
have to make them indifferent between drawing a ball from the left or right urn. The partici-
pants thereby determined the CEs of the lotteries presented on the left side of the panel. 
Fifty eight subjects took part in the experiment. Thirty four were students of the Warsaw 
School of Economics and the rest were students of the University of Social Sciences and Hu-
manities in Warsaw. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 39 years with a median of 
24 years and 61% were women. 
The experiment was conducted on the website: http://eksperymenty.sgh.waw.pl. Participation 
was voluntary, but the participants received additional marks in their exams. They were also 
given a 10-zł voucher that they could redeem in the campus cafeteria or bookstore. 
The participants first registered and familiarized themselves with the instructions online. They 
were then required to solve two sample problems. The time to answer all questions was 
planned at 40-50 minutes, although the participants were asked to work at their own pace. The 
average time was about 50 minutes. This way, the value of the voucher (10 zł) exceeded the 
minimum hourly wage in Poland, which is about 10 zł. 
5 Results. 
5.1 Aggregating the data. 
Median CE values are normally used to analyze data in this kind of experiments as subjects’ 
responses are noisy, skewed and contain a large number of outliers. A trimmed mean of 20% 
middle CE values for each lottery, however, was also examined so as not to lose the remain-
ing information in the sample. An average of both median and trimmed mean CE values, as a 
compromise between the two, was used for further analysis. 
These median/trimmed mean CE values were finally combined for the two payoff schedules. 
The aggregated CE value was calculated as the average of the triple CE value for the 0 zł, 150 
zł and 300 zł payoffs and the single CE value for the 0 zł, 450 zł and 900 zł payoffs. These 
aggregated CE values are presented in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1. Aggregated CE values. 
Although the correctness of combining data for the two payoff schedules is debatable, it was 
employed to further reduce the “noise” and to observe the pattern of the indifference curves, 
which is common to both ranges. The differences between the two payoff schedules are of 
less interest, at least for the results presented in this paper. It needs to be added that the use of 
two payoff schedules in the experiment was primarily intended to avoid restricting subjects to 
a single set of lottery outcomes, as this might have caused unfavorable distortion in their re-
sponses. Combining the data further reduces the danger of detecting any accidental effect. 
5.2 Plotting the indifferences curves. 
The experimental data was analyzed and visualized using the Wolfram Mathematica program, 
in particular the ListContourPlot function. This function generates a contour plot from values 
defined at specific points (the contours are the required indifference curves). The function 
smoothens the contours by linearly interpolating values between adjacent points. The function 
also allows arbitrary chosen contours to be plotted, either by setting the number of contours 
(e.g. by giving the directive “Contours -> 4” to have four contour values calculated automati-
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cally), or by setting exact contour values (e.g. by giving the directive “Contours - > {0, 100, 
200, 300}” or “Contours -> Range[0, 300, 100]”). The plots presented later in this paper were 
generated using the directives “Contours -> Range[0, 300, 15]” or “Contours -> Range[0, 
900, 45]” depending on the range of payoffs. The separate indifference curves obtained this 
way for each of the two payoff schedules are visualized in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 Experimental results presented on two Marschak-Machina triangles: left with payoffs x1 = 0 zł, 
x2 = 150 zł, and x3 = 300 zł; right with x1 = 0 zł, x2 = 450 zł and x3 = 900 zł. 
An interesting feature of the method is that indifference curves are expressed in terms of 
monetary CE values, rather than hypothetical “utils” (see plot legends). The Mathematica® 
program draws colored contour plots, so that areas of low CE contour values are marked us-
ing “cold” colors and areas of high contour values are marked using “warm” colors (in black 
and white: “dark” and “light” respectively). 
The indifferences curves obtained using the combined data (see Table 5-1) are presented in 
Figure 5.2 (left). These curves have the same general shape as those obtained for the separate 
payoff schedules, but the quality of the plot is much better and the curves are much smoother. 
This justifies the use of combined data. 
Figure 5.2 (right) illustrates the operation of the Mathematica® program. The mesh lines used 
to derive the contours are shown. These connect adjacent points representing the lotteries un-
der examination (see dots). As explained, the Mathematica® program linearly interpolates CE 
values along the mesh lines and uses these interpolated values to plot the required indifference 
curves. 
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Figure 5.2 Experimental results combined for the two ranges without (left) and with (right) mesh lines. 
5.3 Main observations. 
Several observations need to be made. 
First, the indifference curves seem to be straight parallel lines in the middle of the triangle. 
This is the area where the subjects’ behavior conforms to EUT. 
Second, the further north of the origin towards the northwest corner of the triangle, the flatter 
the slopes of the indifference curves, and the further east of the origin towards the southeast 
corner of the triangle, the steeper the slopes of the indifference curves. This results in a pat-
tern of “fanning-in” around the two legs of the triangle, especially in the areas near the north-
west and southeast corners (this effect is more pronounced in the former case). This pattern 
not only contradicts the predictions of EUT but also those of other theories consistent with the 
Machina “fanning-out” hypothesis. At the same time, however, the effect of changing the 
slope leads to a pattern resembling “fanning-out” in the area around the southwest corner of 
the triangle. 
Third, the indifference curves appear to have jumps in the direction of the origin near the legs 
of the triangle. This is the area where boundary effects are present. Significantly, these jumps 
are not present near the hypotenuse. This pattern is only consistent with those few theories 
that predict discontinuous jumps at the legs of the triangle (but not at the hypotenuse). 
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6 Discussion 
Most of the previous experiments concerning indifference curves were based on preference 
questions. As such, they only tested hypotheses regarding their shapes. They did not enable 
any indifference curves to be plotted. While the observations presented in Section 5 confirm 
many previously obtained results, they also shed new light on the shape of indifference curves 
in the Marschak-Machina triangle. This Section discusses the results of the experiment in 
more detail and compares them with the results presented in the literature to date. 
6.1 Conformance with EU 
As noted, the indifference curves seem to be straight parallel lines in the middle part of the 
Marschak-Machina triangle, especially where probabilities p1 and p3 are both greater than or 
equal to 0.2. This area is presented separately in Figure 6.1 (the colors are omitted so as to 
give a better view of the plot details). 
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Figure 6.1 Indifference curves in the interior of the Marschak-Machina triangle, where p1 and p3 are both 
greater than or equal to 0.2. Left: with the dots representing the lotteries located in the selected area. 
Right: with the indifference curves (dashed) predicted by a linear model. 
The solid lines represent indifference curves obtained from the experiment. The dashed lines 
in the right panel represent indifference curves predicted by the model 
7.4651.4551.408 13 +−= ppCE , which is the best-fit linear model estimated using 16 lotter-
ies located within the presented area (see dots in the left panel). The fit is almost perfect (Ad-
justed R2 = 0.9998). 
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The above linear model does not, however, provide direct information about the slope of the 
indifference curves. Therefore, a linear model: 
 CEcpbap ++= 13   (1.3) 
in which the required slope is given by the parameter b is used in this Section. The minimum 
least square procedure leads to the fitted model with Adjusted R2 = 0.999 and the parameters 
presented in Table 6-1. As can be seen, the slope assumes a value of 1.10 and all the parame-
ters are statistically significant. 
???? ??? ???????? ????? ??????????? ???????
? !??????? ????????? !?????? ??????"??!??
? ??????? ????????? ??????? ??????"??!??
? ?????????? ???????????? ??????? ???????"??!?? 
Table 6-1 ANOVA table for the linear model (1.3) estimated using 16 lotteries located in the area present-
ed in Figure 6.1. 
The observation that the EU model works fine for lotteries inside the Marschak-Machina tri-
angle has often been reported in the literature. Hey and Orme (1994) state that the EU model 
appears to fit no worse than any of the other models for 39% of subjects. Similarly, Carbone 
and Hey (1994) find that approximately half their subjects appear to conform to the EU mod-
el. Hey and Strazzera (1989) additionally find that, for the majority of their subjects, the indif-
ference curves were in accordance with EU theory. 
 
Figure 6.2. Stylized risk-structure dependence effects (from Abdellaoui and Munier, 1998). 
Abdellaoui and Munier (1998) show that indifference curves assume very different types of 
shapes according to their location within the triangle, i.e. that preferences under risk funda-
mentally depend on the risk-structure facing the decision–maker (see Figure 6.2). The authors 
find that the shape of the indifference curve is compatible with the EU hypothesis along the 
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middle part of the hypotenuse and in the “immediate” interior of that middle part. Their result 
is very close to that obtained in the present experiment. 
6.2 “Fanning-out” versus “fanning-in” 
As stated in Section 5, the indifference curves seem to show a pattern of “fanning–out” near 
the triangle origin, and a pattern of “fanning-in” as they approach the other triangle corners. 
This observation is confirmed by a more detailed analysis. 
The area of the Marschak-Machina triangle has been restricted to either 2.001.0 1 ≤≤ p  or 
2.001.0 3 ≤≤ p  to exclude the impact of the boundary effects and central parallelism de-
scribed in the former sub-section. This area, together with the dots representing lotteries with-
in it, is presented in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3 Indifference curves in the area where p1 or p3 are in the range [0.01, 0.2]. Dots represent lotter-
ies located in the selected area. 
The selected area has been further split into smaller regions along the horizontal and vertical 
legs. A linear regression procedure was performed in each of these regions to obtain a number 
of linear models (1.3) approximating the indifference curves locally. Estimations of the indif-
ference curve slopes are shown in Table 6-2 and Table 6-3. 
It should be noted that the slopes along the horizontal leg generally assume greater, and the 
slopes along the vertical leg smaller, values than those in the middle of the triangle (i.e. 1.10). 
Moreover, these slope values increase and decrease as they approach the southeast and north-
west corners respectively. 
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Table 6-2. Local estimations of indifference curve slopes along the horizontal leg (where 
2.001.0 3 ≤≤ p ).  
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Table 6-3. Local estimations of indifference curve slopes along the vertical leg (where 2.001.0 1 ≤≤ p ). 
Local, linear models of the indifference curves were finally extrapolated outside the triangle 
to show both “fanning-out” and “fanning-in” patterns as in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 Indifference curves estimated locally in the interior of the Marschak-Machina triangle (re-
stricted by either p1 or p3 in the range [0.01, 0.2]) and extrapolated outside of the triangle to show the 
“fanning-out” pattern near the triangle origin (left) and the “fanning-in” patterns near the other triangle 
corners (right).  
The existence of fanning-in for different subjects has been reported in the literature by e.g. 
Hey and Di Cagno (1990), who observed that the fanning-in point was to the northeast of one 
the three triangles for 14 subjects. Moreover, the indifference curves fan in for 22 of the 56 
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subject/triangle pairs. 
The results obtained in the present study confirm at least two of the earlier surveys. First, Ab-
dellaoui and Munier (1998) stated that fanning-out is present near the southwest corner and 
along both legs of the triangle (see Figure 6.2). Although they observed concave indifference 
lines near the northwest corner and convex indifference curves near the southeast corner, the-
se observations might also confirm the “fanning-in” hypothesis in those areas. 
Blavatskyy (2006) presents a more detailed study concerning “fanning-out” and “fanning-in”. 
Blavatskyy claims that a universal fanning-out hypothesis has to be rejected. There is a grow-
ing body of evidence to suggest that an individual’s indifference curves tend to fan in when 
probability mass is associated with the best and the worst outcomes and tend to fan out when 
probability mass is associated with outcomes in between. Blavatskyy presented the summary 
of his survey diagrammatically (see Figure 6.5). 
 
Figure 6.5 Empirical evidence for fanning-in (from Blavatskyy, 2006). 
The results concerning the fanning-out and fanning-in presented in this paper are clearly very 
close to Blavatskyy’s summary. 
6.3 Boundary effects 
As stated in Section 5, jumps towards the origin are observed in the indifference curves along 
both legs of the triangle. These boundary effects are, however, not present along the hypote-
nuse. So as to better visualize this observation, the area where p1, p2, or p3 is less than or equal 
to 0.01 is presented in Figure 6.6. 
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Figure 6.6 Indifference curves in the area where p1, p2 or p3 is less than or equal to 0.01. Dots represent 
lotteries located in the selected area. 
Local, linear approximations of the indifference curves for p1 and p3 less than or equal to 0.01 
have been made to confirm this observation. The results for the slopes in the regions along the 
horizontal leg are presented in Table 6-4. 
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Table 6-4. Local estimations of indifference curve slopes along the horizontal leg (where 01.00 3 ≤≤ p ). 
As can be seen, the slopes of the indifference curves along the horizontal leg in the slice 
01.00 1 ≤≤ p  assume values from 0.10 to 0.15. These values differ much from the corre-
sponding values 0.68 to 3.49 obtained in the slice 2.001.0 3 ≤≤ p  (cf. Table 6-2). Importantly, 
except for the regions close to the triangle corners, the estimated slope values are statistically 
significant for both slices. Despite this, an additional estimation was made for the middle part 
of the horizontal leg, i.e. for 8.02.0 1 ≤≤ p . The results for the two slices are presented in Ta-
ble 6-5. 
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Table 6-5. Local estimations of indifference curve slopes in the middle part of the horizontal leg 
( 8.02.0 1 ≤≤ p ) for slices 01.00 3 ≤≤ p  and 2.001.0 3 ≤≤ p . 
These results confirm the observation regarding a jump towards the origin in the indifference 
curves along the horizontal leg of the triangle. The indifference curves are steep for 
2.001.0 3 ≤≤ p  (a slope of 1.65), but very flat for 01.03 ≤p  (a slope of 0.11). These results 
are statistically significant. 
Analogous estimation results for local slopes in regions along the vertical leg are presented in 
Table 6-6. 
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Table 6-6 Local estimations of indifference curve slopes along the vertical leg (where 01.00 1 ≤≤ p ). 
As can be seen, the slopes of the indifference curves along the vertical leg in the slice 
01.00 1 ≤≤ p  assume values from 2.32 to 13.59. Again, these values differ much from the 
corresponding values -0.05 to 0.88 obtained for the slice 2.001.0 1 ≤≤ p  (cf. Table 6-3). The 
statistical significance of the obtained slope values is, however, mixed. An additional estima-
tion was therefore made for the middle part of the vertical leg, i.e. for 8.02.0 3 ≤≤ p . The 
results for both slices are presented in Table 6-7. 
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Table 6-7. Local estimations of indifference curve slopes in the middle part of the vertical leg 
( 8.02.0 3 ≤≤ p ) for slices 01.00 1 ≤≤ p  and 2.001.0 1 ≤≤ p . 
These results likewise confirm the observation regarding a jump towards the origin in the in-
difference curves along the vertical leg of the triangle. The indifference curves are flat for 
2.001.0 1 ≤≤ p  (a slope of 0.62), and very steep for 01.00 1 ≤≤ p  (a slope of 9.99). These 
results are also statistically significant. 
The evidence in the literature concerning boundary effects is in line with that concerning the 
conformance of the EU model in the interior of the triangle. It was noted very early on that 
most of the evidence demonstrating the failure of the EU model involves choices having dif-
ferent numbers of possible outcomes (e.g. Conlisk, 1989; Neilson, 1992). For example, of the 
four lotteries involved in the Allais paradox, there is one with three probable outcomes, two 
with two probable outcomes and one with one probable outcome. Conlisk moved the Allais 
chords to the interior of the triangle, which purged the Allais example of the certainty, or 
double boundary effect. Conlisk concluded that EU theory violations are less frequent and 
cease to be systematic when boundary effects are removed. 
Camerer (1989), Harless (1992), and Sopher and Gigliotti (1993) obtained similar results. 
Harless and Camerer (1994), after analyzing a large number of experimental data sets, con-
clude that the EU model should be used when all the lotteries have the same number of prob-
able outcomes (i.e. the lotteries are located in the interior of the triangle), but a different mod-
el has to be used when the lotteries have different numbers of probable outcomes (i.e. some of 
the lotteries are located on the boundaries or in the corners of the triangle). 
Boundary effects were studied in detail by Abdellaoui and Munier (1998), who stated that 
indifference curves were distorted near triangle boundaries. They draw a distinction, however, 
between behavior near different edges of the triangle. One test, restricted to segments linking 
the hypotenuse to the triangle interior leads to an acceptance of the hypothesis of parallelism. 
By contrast, the same hypothesis concerning the segments linking the left and lower edges to 
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the interior is strongly rejected. The present experiment not only captures this difference but 
additionally shows that the distortion near the triangle legs is due to jumps towards the trian-
gle origin in the indifference curves. 
6.4 Continuous or discontinuous indifference curves? 
All the local estimations of the indifference curve slopes are shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7. Indifference curves obtained from the experiment presented together with local estimations of 
their slopes. 
These data raise the question as to whether these jumps at the triangle legs are continuous or 
discontinuous. It could be argued that 0.01, the minimum non-zero probability used in the 
experiment, is still far greater than 0 (at least on a logarithmic scale) and that the indifference 
curves might become smooth for probabilities of less than 0.01. The hypothesis regarding 
continuity or discontinuity of the indifference curves at the triangle legs is, however, not falsi-
fiable. Even if the jumps observed in the experiment had occurred at a probability of say 
0.001, it could still be argued that this was far greater than 0. 
The path of the indifference curves near the two legs of the triangle suggests, however, that 
the jumps in the curves are discontinuous. It is highly unlikely that the indifference curves, 
which are parallel as they depart from the hypotenuse and remain so in the middle of the tri-
angle, would first turn away from the origin, and then (somewhere between a probability of 0 
and 0.01) smoothly turn back towards it. Smooth curves would be an especially difficult as-
sumption to maintain for the vertical leg of the triangle, as the indifference lines are almost 
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flat for p3 greater than 0.6 and p1 greater than 0.01, and then suddenly fall to lower probability 
values on the p3 axis. The indifference curve discontinuity hypothesis would not require such 
dramatic changes in the slope values: the indifference curves would remain steep near the 
horizontal leg for any non-zero probability p3, and remain flat near the vertical leg for any 
non-zero probability p1. 
The discontinuity of indifference curves is not particularly welcomed by mathematicians and 
could even be regarded as a weakness in the model. This feature, however, has a solid psy-
chological foundation. First, the tendency to overweight certain outcomes relative to merely 
probable ones was labeled the “certainty effect” by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This, 
however, does not explain the pattern where jumps do not appear at the hypotenuse (to reca-
pitulate: indifference curves are discontinuous at all three triangle boundaries in the original 
Prospect Theory). 
This phenomenon can, however, be explained by observing that lotteries located on the legs 
of the triangle do not have the same support as those located in the rest of the triangle (includ-
ing the hypotenuse) (Abdellaoui and Munier, 1998). As a result, either p1 = 0 or p3 = 0 implies 
a more dramatic change in individual behavior than p2 = 0. 
The same psychological observation underlies those models that predict that changing the 
security level and/or potential level (or more generally the range) of a lottery results in indif-
ference curves that are discontinuous at the legs of the triangle, but not at the hypotenuse 
(Cohen, 1992; Kontek, Lewandowski, 2013). 
6.5 When might fanning-in and boundary effects not be observed? 
It is worth noting that the effects of fanning-in and (possibly discontinuous) jumps might not 
be observable in experimental set-ups where the lotteries are far from the triangle boundaries. 
This is a consequence of the fact that, to some extent, the two effects cancel each other out: 
the indifference curves departing from the hypotenuse turn away from the origin, while the 
jump at the leg turns towards it. 
To verify this effect, another analysis of the experimental data was performed. This time, lot-
teries in the interior close to the legs and the hypotenuse (i.e. having probabilities of either 
0.01 or 0.05) were excluded. The resulting set of lotteries is presented in Figure 6.8 (left) and 
the resulting indifference curves are presented in Figure 6.8 (right). 
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Figure 6.8 Left: lotteries on the Marschak-Machina triangle with those close to the legs and the hypote-
nuse excluded. Right: the resulting indifference curves presented with the local slope values. 
The (discontinuous) jumps have disappeared completely. Fanning-out is observed over a 
much wider area near the southwest corner and along both triangle legs up to a probability of 
0.6 for both p1 and p3. Fanning-in can only be seen near the northwest and southeast corners 
(and even there it is barely visible). The wider presence of the fanning-out pattern shows that 
the two effects are not equal in magnitude: the (discontinuous) jump towards the triangle 
origin is greater than the shift of the indifference curve in the opposite direction (fanning-in). 
The resulting fanning-in pattern is also weaker because the (discontinuous) jump cancels out a 
large portion of the shift of the indifference curves towards the triangle corners. 
The analysis done using the given subset of lotteries would therefore support Machina’s fan-
ning-out hypothesis. At the same time, this hypothesis would, in general, be rejected using the 
full set of lotteries, as presented in previous subsections. 
7 Econometric verification 
This paper is intended to present a non-parametric method of plotting indifference curves in 
the Marschak-Machina triangle. However, many of the data collected in the experiment ena-
ble decision-making models to be compared. Only a brief summary of studies of this kind is 
presented in this paper. A more detailed analysis is left for future research. 
Four models are analyzed: EUT, CPT, TAX, and Decision Utility Theory (DUT). As before, 
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it is assumed that x1 < x2 < x3. A power utility function ( ) αxxu =  is assumed for the first three 
models. The CE value in the EUT model is calculated using the formula: 
 ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎣
⎡= ∑
=
−
3
1
1
i
iiEUT pxuuCE  (1.4) 
The probability weighting function in the CPT model is described using the two-parameter 
Prelec function: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]δγ pExppw ln−−=   (1.5) 
The CE value in the CPT model is calculated using the formula: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }2313232331 1 ppwxupwppwxupwxuuCECPT +−+−++= −   (1.6) 
The probability weighting function in the TAX model is described using a power function 
( ) γppt = . The formula for the CE value in the TAX model depends on the number of out-
comes. For lotteries involving two outcomes, the following formula holds (subscript L de-
notes the lower outcome and subscript H denotes the higher outcome): 
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and for lotteries involving three outcomes: 
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The CE value in the DUT model is calculated using the formula: 
 ( ) ⎥
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where D is the decision utility function defined in the normalized lottery range [0,1]. The 
formula applies to any number of outcomes, but in the case of two-outcome lotteries it simpli-
fies to: 
 ( ) ( )HLHLDUT pDxxxCE 12 −−+=   (1.10) 
where Lx  and Hx  are the lower and the higher outcomes, and Hp  is the probability of win-
ning the higher outcome. The D function is described here using the two-parameter Prelec 
function: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]δγ rExprD ln−−=   (1.11) 
the same as (1.5). In this formula r denotes the relative position of xi within the lottery range 
[x1, x3].  
The estimation was performed using the Mathematica® NonlinearModelFit function, which 
constructs a nonlinear least-squares model and assumes that errors are independent and nor-
mally distributed. The estimation results are presented in Table 7-1. 
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Table 7-1 Estimation results of several decision-making models under risk. 
The only “Goodness-of-fit” measure to be explained is “Adj. R2 norm” (in the third column), 
which informs about the explained variation of the observed difference between CE and Ex-
pected Value (EV) for every lottery. This measure assumes much lower values than the stand-
ard “Adj. R2” (in the second column), which informs about the explained variation of the 
observed CE values. 
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As presented, the two-parameter DUT model offers the best fit and is able to explain 57.9% of 
the observed variation between the CE and EV values. TAX is the next best despite having 
three parameters. This model explains 40.7% of the variation. The CPT model, which also has 
3 parameters, explains 35.6% of the variation. As expected, the EUT model is the worst. A 
negative “Adj. R2 norm” value means that, compared to EV, adding a parameter to describe 
the utility function in the EUT model does not improve the fit to a degree that would justify 
adding this parameter. This model ranking is also confirmed by AIC and BIC measures. 
Figure 7.1 presents the indifference curves predicted by the best-fit EUT, CPT, DUT and 
TAX models together with the indifference curves observed in the experiment. 
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Figure 7.1 Indifference curves obtained non-parametrically (dashed) and predicted by the best-fit models: 
EUT (left, top), CPT (right, top), DUT (left, bottom) and TAX (right, bottom). 
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It can be seen that the DUT model predicts discontinuous jumps on both legs, while the TAX 
model predicts discontinuous jumps on the vertical leg only (to be correct, there are very 
small jumps on the other edges as well because parameter 0≠δ ). This is the reason why the-
se two models best fit the experimental data econometrically. It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that the match is not perfect in the case of all models: there is a difference between the 
predicted and observed indifference curves, especially in the northwest and southeast triangle 
corners. Econometrically speaking, even in the case of the best model, the more than 40% 
difference between CE and EV is not explained. 
The results presented in this Section come with a caveat that the fits and the model ranking 
only apply to the specific grid of lotteries in the Marschak-Machina triangle examined in the 
experiment. This grid involves many lotteries in the vicinity of the triangle edges, so the mod-
el ranking could be quite different for a different grid. The “smooth” indifference curves pre-
sented in Section 6.5 confirm that the result may strongly depend on the choice of lotteries. 
This raises a general question of how to select an optimal grid of lotteries to discriminate be-
tween the decision-making models (Cavagnaro et al., 2013), which problem is out of scope of 
this paper. 
8 Summary 
This paper proposes a new method of estimating indifference curves inside the Marschak-
Machina triangle by using lottery certainty equivalents. This method has several advantages 
over those methods used to determine indifference curves by asking indifference and prefer-
ence questions. 
Compared with methods based on preference questions, the new method (as do all methods 
based on indifference questions) yields far more information about the true shape of indiffer-
ence curves. The experimenter thus obtains uniquely determined indifference curves rather 
than merely the results of hypothesis tests. 
When compared with methods based on indifference questions, it is much easier to state indif-
ference between a multi-outcome lottery and a certain monetary value than between two mul-
ti-outcome lotteries. One obvious reason for this is that a certain monetary value is a single 
number, whereas an alternative lottery is a combination of xi and pi values. Another reason is 
that a CE is a unique response to a question; an infinite number of indifferent lotteries that 
could serve as an answer make the question more difficult. For these reasons, many more 
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questions can be answered during an experiment session. This results in a more precise de-
termination of indifference curves. As it happened, the participants were able to answer 134 
questions during a session that lasted less than an hour. 
Significantly, interpolating CE values between adjacent points representing lotteries allows 
any indifference curve to be determined. A specific indifference curve can be chosen even 
after the experimental results have been collected. This feature stands in stark contrast to 
those methods where the experimenter is limited to the curves that cross the initially chosen 
lotteries. Another interesting feature is that indifference curves are expressed in terms of 
monetary CE values, rather than hypothetical “utils”. Last but not least, these indifference 
curves can be computed using the well-known Mathematica program. There is no need to 
write a single line of dedicated software. 
This paper also presents some interesting experimental results concerning the shape of indif-
ference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle. First, it was stated that indifference curves 
are straight parallel lines in the middle part of the Marschak-Machina triangle. This is the area 
of conformance to the Expected Utility model. Second, it was stated that the indifference 
curves “fan–out” close the triangle origin, but “fan-in” towards the other triangle corners. 
Third, it was stated that the indifference curves jump towards the origin along the two legs of 
the triangle. Moreover, as the indifference curves approach the legs of the triangle from the 
interior, they first turn towards the corners and then jump towards the origin. This suggests 
that the jumps may be discontinuous. These boundary effects are, however, not present at the 
hypotenuse. Finally, excluding lotteries close to the triangle boundaries from the analysis, 
also removes the boundary effects, reduces the fanning-in and extends the fanning-out pattern 
hypothesized by Machina. 
This paper concludes by stating that no existing theory is able to fully accommodate the ex-
perimental data presented here. EUT only works in part of the Marschak–Machina triangle. 
The existence of areas where there is fanning-in is highly problematic for any theory for 
which the fanning-out hypothesis (or a related axiom) is an underlying assumption. At the 
same time, however, areas of parallelism and fanning-out do not allow the general fanning-in 
hypothesis to be accepted. Finally, the (possibly discontinuous) jumps at the legs of the trian-
gle, and the lack of such jumps at the hypotenuse, are a problem for all but a few of the theo-
ries that assume that changing the minimum and/or maximum payoffs leads to such discon-
tinuous jumps. These theories, however, assume that indifference curves inside the triangle 
are straight and parallel, and therefore do not easily accommodate other evidence. The final 
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conclusion is confirmed by the estimation results of four decision-making models under risk. 
Even the best model cannot explain more than 40% of the variation between CE and EV. The 
theory that can accommodate the evidence presented here is still waiting to be developed. 
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